Can EVM be Hacked?

To combat the spread of misinformation and uphold the integrity of the electoral process, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has answered queries related to hacking of EVM.

Here are the answer to common queries.

Can EVM be Hacked?

‘Hacking' is unauthorised access to or control over computer network security systems for some illicit purpose.

In the case of ECI EVMs, the 'Hacking' is not possible for following reasons:

• The EVM is a stand-alone machine and is not connected to any network through wire or wirelessly.
• The Software is one time Programmable and Microcontroller can neither be read nor modified.

Can EVM be remotely altered through wireless communication?

It is alleged this can be done by either replacing the original display module with another display fitted with a wireless device or inserting an extra circuit board which can communicate with an external unit via a wireless device and tamper the result by controlling the CU display used for declaring the result.

• Such a modification would require unfettered access to the EVM after First Level Checking
• In M3 EVMs the display is mounted in the UADM. Any attempt to open the UADM will send the EVM into Factory Mode.

Can EVM memory be manipulated?

It is alleged that voting data can be altered by clipping a Memory Manipulator IC to the memory chip where Vote data is stored. This would need

• Full and free access to Control Units after the Polling is over. The same is not possible since EVMs are kept in administrative safeguard.
• Breaking the seals and locks of the strong room is not possible due to two layers of security, CCTV coverage and close watch of representatives of the candidates near the strong room.
• The memory is inside the microcontroller which itself is inside the UADM. Any attempt to open the UADM will send the EVM into Factory Mode.

Microcontroller/Memory Chip or Motherboard can be replaced in EVM?

The same cannot be possible due to following Administrative and Technical Safeguards.

Administrative Safeguards

• Chip replacement would require access to EVM Warehouses.
• Any chip replacement before FLC will get caught during FLC.
• Chip Replacement after FLC would require access to Strong Rooms and breaking of EVM Pink Paper seals.

Technical Safeguard

• Microcontroller of EVMs is inside the UADM and the same cannot be accessed without putting the EVM in Factory Mode.

BUs and CUs communicate only amongst themselves after mutual authentication and cannot be connected to any other machine/device. Thus, any modified EVM (with microcontroller/memory changed) would not be usable even if someone is able to hypothetically bypass security arrangements and modify EVM.

Can defective EVMs record wrong votes?

EVMS may fail to function due to any mechanical, structural or physical defect like faulty switches, broken button, faulty connections etc. However, these NEVER record a Wrong Vote.

• Before used in actual poll EVMs function is checked three times i.e. during FLC, candidate setting, before the start of poll.
• Serial Numbers and reason of non-functional EVMs are noted and the same are sent to the manufacturers for analysis and repair.

Manufacturers follow the same security protocols during repair as they do for manufacturing of new EVMs.

Are EVMs transported in an Unsecured way?

EVMs are always transported in secure manner. The following may be seen:

Allocation of Planned Action

• EVMS are allocated to poll going State by the ECI. All allocations are EVM Management Software (EMS) developed by ECI.

• Receiver District Election Officer (DEO) is responsible for secured storage of allocated EVMs.

• EMS is used for inventory management of all EVMs nationwide for the sake of transparency.

Secured Transportation

• Movement of EVMS mandatorily managed through EVM Management System (EMS).
• Only Containerized/Sealed Trucks used.
• All Trucks sealed with Lock and Paper Seals.
• Mandatory GPS tracking of EVM vehicles.
• All movement under 24X7 Police Escort.
• Videography is done for entire shifting process.

Political parties are informed in advance about the opening, stocking and sealing of warehouses while moving EVMs.

Are Political Parties involved in the election related processes?

Political Parties are involved in following Election related Activity/Process

Opening and Closing of EVM warehouse

• During non-election period till finalization of list of the contesting candidates, EVM-VVPAT warehouses are opened/closed (for any purpose like movement, inspection etc.) in the presence of the representatives of National and State Recognised Political Parties.

• With finalization of list of the contesting candidates, candidates and their representatives are involved while opening and closing of EVM-VVPAT warehouses/strong room.

• Opening and Closing of EVM warehouse/strong room is done under videography.

First Level Checking of EVMs and VVPATs 

• First Level Checking of EVMs and VVPATs is conducted before every election by the authorised engineers of Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL) at DEO level.

• For this purpose, National and State Recognised Political Parties at district headquarters are invited in writing by DEO concerned at least two days before the beginning of FLC and a copy is endorsed to state headquarters.

• The representatives of National and State Recognised Political Parties are involved to oversee entire FLC process.

• Higher mock poll is conducted in 5% randomly selected EVMs and VVPATs (i.e. 1200 votes in 1% EVMs, 1000 votes in 2% EVMs and 500 votes in 2% EVMs). The electronic result of EVM is tallied with the VVPAT slips count. The representatives of National and State Recognised Political Parties are allowed to pick 5% EVMs and VVPATs randomly and also to do mock poll.

• List of FLC ok EVMs and VVPATs is shared with all National and State Recognised Political Parties.

• The representatives of National and State Recognised Political Parties are allowed to sign the seals, forms, register during FLC.

Taking out of EVMs and VVPATs for Training and Awareness after FLC 

• After completion of FLC, maximum up to 10% EVMs and VVPATs are taken out for awareness and training purpose in the presence of National and State Recognised Political Parties.

• The list of awareness and training EVMs and VVPATs is shared with them.

Randomizations of EVMs and VVPATs 

• First randomization of EVMs and VVPATs is conducted in the presence of National and State Recognised Political Parties to allocate EVMs and VVPATs Assembly constituency/ segment-wise.

• List of first randomized EVMs and VVPATs (AC/AS-wise) is shared with National and State Recognised Political Parties.

• After finalization of list of contesting candidate, list of first randomized EVMs and VVPATs (AC/AS-wise) is also shared with contesting candidate.

• Second randomization of EVMs and VVPATs is conducted, before commissioning of EVMs and VVPATs, in the presence of contesting candidates to allocate polling station wise and reserve machines.

• The list of second randomized EVMs and VVPATs is shared with contesting candidates.

Commissioning of EVMs and VVPATs

• Commissioning of EVMs and VVPATs for use in poll is done in the presence of contesting candidates.

• Candidates/their representatives are allowed to sign the seals used in sealing EVMs and VVPATs.

• Higher mock poll is conducted in 5% randomly selected EVMs and VVPATs by casting 1000 votes. The electronic result of EVM is tallied with the VVPAT slips count. Candidates/their representatives are allowed to pick 5% EVMs and VVPATs randomly and also to do mock poll.

Dispersal of EVMs and VVPATs with Polling Parties

• Dispersal of EVMs and VVPATs are done in the presence of the contesting candidates.

Mock Poll and Actual Poll on Poll Day

• Mock Poll on Poll day is conducted at every polling station in the presence of the polling agents nominated by the contesting candidates.

• Polling agents nominated by the contesting candidates are allowed to remain in polling stations to observe polling process.

• Polling agents are allowed to sign the seals used in sealing EVMs and VVPATs (before commencement of poll and close of poll).

Transportation of polled EVMs and VVPATs from Polling Stations to Collection Centre 

• Candidates/Polling agents are allowed to follow vehicles carrying polled EVMs and VVPATs from polling station to collection centre.

Storage of Polled EVMs and VVPATs 

• Polled EVMs and VVPATs are stored in the strong room in the presence of Candidates/their representatives.

• Candidates/their representatives are also allowed to put their seals on the locks of the strong room.

• Candidates/their representatives are also allowed to monitor storage and security of polled EVMs and VVPATs.

Counting Day 

• Polled Strong Room is opened in the presence of Candidates/their representatives, Returning Officer, ECI Observer on counting days.

• Counting of votes is done in the presence of candidates and counting agents appointed by them.

• After completion of counting of votes, VVPAT slips are taken out from VVPATs and stored in black envelope in the presence of the candidates/their representatives.

• After counting of votes, EVMs and VVPAT slips are kept in the strong rooms in the presence of candidates/their representatives. They are allowed to put their seals on the locks of the strong rooms. 

EVM FAQs

Vote Stuffing after Poll Closure is possible in EVM Seals can be broken and votes stuffed while transporting If the CLOSE button is not properly pressed and Votes can be Stuffed while transporting?

After completion of poll i.e. when the last voter has voted, the Officer in-charge of the Control Unit/Presiding Officer presses the ‘Close’ Button. Thereafter, the EVM does not accept any vote. The poll ‘start time’ and ‘end time’ are recorded in the machine as well as by the Presiding Officer. After the close of poll, the CU is switched off and thereafter the Ballot Unit is disconnected from the CU and kept separately in the respective carrying cases and sealed. Further, the Presiding officer has to hand over to each polling agent a copy of the account of votes recorded in Form 17- C. At the time of counting of votes, the total votes recorded in a particular control unit is tallied with this account and if there is any discrepancy, this can be pointed out by the Counting Agents of candidates.

Can Tampered Source Code TROJAN be introduced in EVM?

It is alleged that Trojan can be introduced in the following manner:

• by reprogramming the chip and
• by the chip manufacturer during fusing of the software.

The same cannot be possible in following ways

• Re-programming Ruled Out as these are One Time Programmable Chips.
• Code tampering by the chip manufacturer Ruled Out as the software is ported by BEL/ECIL in their factories in the highest security environment. 

Are EVMs not used in any other country ?

Electronic Voting Machines are used in other countries like USA, Brazil, Namibia, Bhutan etc. also. 

Can VVPAT coded message to Control Unit be tampered?

Votes are recorded only in Control Units and not in VVPATs. VVPATs are only meant for the voter to confirm his/her vote by way of printing of the ballot slip which is stored in a sealed box under the printer and viewing window of VVPAT. VVPAT is a device that remains under the control of the Control Unit and receives instructions from the CU to print the ballot slip corresponding to the key pressed at the BU by the Voter. VVPAT sends an acknowledgement to the CU to mark the completion of successful printing. CU then initiates the cut of VVPAT slip. VVPAT slips so printed remains visible to the voter for about 7 seconds before the slip is cut and made to fall successfully in the sealed ballot slip compartment. Only after a successful completion of all these steps, the VPPAT sends a successful printing and cutting acknowledgement to the CU, after which CU records the vote electronically.

Are EVMs manufactured by Private firms?

The EVMs have been devised and designed by the Technical Experts Committee (TEC) of the Election Commission in collaboration with two Public Sector undertakings viz., Bharat Electronics Ltd., Bangalore (Under Ministry of Defence) and Electronic Corporation of India Ltd. Hyderabad (Under Department of Atomic Energy). The EVMs are manufactured by the above two undertakings.

Can EVMs be used in areas where there is no electricity?

EVM and VVPAT do not require any external power supply. EVM and VVPAT run on their own battery power-packs supplied by Bharat Electronics Limited & Electronics Corporation of India Limited. EVM runs on a Power Pack of 7.5 Volts and VVPAT runs on a power-pack of 22.5 Volts.

Are EVMs are too expensive?

The cost of a BU is Rs.7,991/-, CU is Rs.9,812/- and VVPAT is Rs.16,132/-. Even though the initial investment seems somewhat heavy, this is more than set off by the savings in the matter of printing of ballot papers in lakhs for every election, their transportation, storage etc., and the substantial reduction in the counting staff and the remuneration paid to them.

Can Voting be done more than once by pressing the button again and again on the EVM?

No, it is not possible to vote more than once on an EVM. As soon as a particular button on the Ballot Unit is pressed, the vote is recorded for that particular candidate. The machine does not respond to further button presses on the BU. This way the EVMs ensure the principle of “one voter, one vote”. The next vote is enabled only when the Presiding Officer in-charge of the Control Unit releases the Ballot by pressing the Ballot Button on the Control Unit after checking and sending the next voter. This is a distinct advantage over the ballot paper system.

Can a voter get an electric shock while pressing the blue button because of short-circuitry or other reason?

No. EVMs work on a battery and there is absolutely no chance of any voter getting an electric shock at the time of pressing the 'blue button' or at any time of handling the EVM.

Can EVMs be stored without air conditioning?

There is no need to air condition the room/hall where EVMs are stored. What is required is only to keep the room/hall free from dust, dampness and rodents as in the case of ballot boxes.

Has Supreme Court/High Court banned use of EVMs as it can be tampered?

Since 2001, the issue of possible tampering of EVM has been raised before various High Courts. After detailed analysis of the various aspects of the technological security and administrative safeguards around the use of EVMs, the credibility, reliability and robustness of the EVMs has been validated by the various High Courts in all the cases. In some of these cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also dismissed appeals filed by some petitioners against High Court orders, which were in favour of the EVMs. In some cases recently, the Hon’ble courts have also levied penalty, referring the petitions as Publicity Interest Litigation. There is no legal ban on use of EVMs.

Can deployment of EVMs in a particular polling station can be known beforehand?

EVMs are allocated to polling station after two stages of randomisation process through EVM Management System (EMS) software application developed by the Commission. After First Level Checking of EVMs, first randomization of EVMs is done at the District Election Officer level to allocate them Assembly Constituency-wise in the presence of the representative of political parties. Thereafter, before Commissioning of EVMs, second randomisation of EVMs is done at the Returning Officer level to allocate them Polling Station-wise in the presence of candidates/their agents. Two levels of randomisations eliminate any scope of (determining before-hand) the polling station-wise deployment pattern of machines beforehand.

Can sequence in which the candidates appear on the Ballot Unit can be manipulated?

No. The arrangement of names of candidates in the ballot paper of the Ballot Unit is in alphabetical order, first for the National & State Recognised Political Parties, followed by other State Registered Parties, and then by Independent candidates. Thus, the sequence in which the candidates’ names appear on the Ballot Unit is dependent on the names of the candidates and their party affiliation and keeps changing from one election to another. Therefore, the sequence cannot be ascertained in advance.

Can VVPATs be hacked by putting a malware during symbol loading to affect results?

There is no scientific basis to such false claims. ECI has introduced a New Symbol Loading Unit with additional transparency for the purpose of symbol loading in VVPAT. This new SLU allows the symbols to be displayed on the TV/Monitor so that all stakeholders including political party representatives witness the symbol getting uploaded to VVPAT in the first level checking process and during the preparation of EVM/VVPAT.

VVPAT features two different types of memories. One is used to store the software, which is one time programmable making it impossible to tamper using malware. The symbols that are loaded into the VVPAT are in the image file and are stored in flash memory. It is impossible to alter VVPAT software since these two memories are different from each other. Malware cannot be put up intentionally or unintentionally on SLU/VVPAT.

Is counting of printed paper slips of VVPAT is compulsory on the counting day?

Mandatory verification of VVPAT slips of randomly selected 05 polling stations per Assembly Constituency/each Assembly Segment of Parliament Constituency.

2.On Need Basis

In case of non-clearance of mock poll data/slips or mismatch of votes polled in CU and Form-17C, the printed VVPAT slips are counted of respective polling station(s), if winning margin is less than total votes polled in such CU(s).

If any candidate, or in his absence, his election agent or any of his counting agents make a written request to count the printed paper slips of the VVPAT in respect of any polling station or polling stations under Rule 56 D of the Conduct of Elections Rules 1961 to Returning Officer.